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Exclusion and Access in Public
Accommodations: First Amendment
Limitations upon State Law
Public accommodations law exemplifies the furthest reach of the
principle of equality in American law. In pursuit of the goal of equal
access to public accommodations, legislative power has been expan-
sively supported by the judiciary,' and many historically protected
private rights of ownership have lost their traditional sanctity.' Since
public accommodations law seeks to prevent discrimination in a wide
variety of privately owned establishments,3 the operation of the law
presents great potential for conflict between the equality ideal and
individual rights. Reduced to basics, the public accommodations situa-
tion involves an individual who seeks entry into an establishment and
a proprietor who seeks to deny admittance to that individual. A right
of access created by public accommodations law directly opposes a
right to exclude that may arise from a variety of constitutional or
"natural law" sources.' Proprietary interests, along with other personal
liberty interests, create a private right of discrimination that is squarely
at odds with public accommodations law.5
In most cases, these asserted private rights have been held to lack
sufficient constitutional protection to override the interest of the state
in creating equal access to public accommodations.6 The dominance
of the state interest over private rights is in part a reflection of the
early common law regulation of certain types of public accommoda-
tions. At common law, innkeepers and common carriers were under
a duty, in the absence of some reasonable ground for exclusion, to
furnish accommodations to all persons.7 Public accommodations
statutes that relate to certain specifically enumerated businesses such
as inns or restaurants are merely declaratory of common law in that
respect.8 Although the scope of the common law doctrine was relatively
1. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text; infra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
3. See Survey of Public Accommodations Law, 7 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 215,
218 (1978).
4. See Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV.
473, 488 n.33 (1962).
5. See id. at 487-89.
6. See id. at 489.
7. James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 740, 155 P.2d 329, 339-40 (1944).
8. Id.
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narrow, the emphasis of the law in recent years has shifted dramatically
toward protection of the access rights of the public. 9
The rise of equal access rights nevertheless does not mandate the
fall of individual liberties. A certain area of individual liberty that
the Constitution favors over claims of equality must exist.'" This author
will explore the dimensions of that area in the conflict between public
accommodations law and first amendment rights.
A recent California case, Pines v. Tomson," illustrates the tension
between state anti-discrimination interests and individual conduct that
implicates first amendment guarantees. Using the Pines case as a
starting point, this author will focus primarily upon the constitutional
rights of free speech, free press, and free association. Consideration
of the state interest in preventing discrimination will include the present
scope of federal law in addressing the problem,' 2 the legitimate basis
of the state power to do so,' 3 and the history and general scope of
state public accommodations laws.' 4 The particularly broad coverage
of the Unruh Civil Rights Act in California will be discussed."
The typical public accommodations scenario of exclusion and access,
in the context of a written publication, is likely to raise issues of
both free speech and free press.' 6 In a conflict between access rights
and editorial rights in the media, editorial rights traditionally have
prevailed.' 7 The strength of the editorial right generally is unaffected
by the particular type of discrimination practiced'" or the profit motive
of the publication.' 9 The implications of the commercial speech content
of the publication will be considered,2" along with the possible effect
of religious expression. 2'
Despite the status of association as a fundamental first amendment
freedom, freedom of association claims frequently are denied in
challenges to public accommodations law.2" Circumstances will be
proposed in which the associational interest will prevail over the
9. See Henkin, supra note 4, at 489.
10. Id. at 490.
11. 160 Cal. App. 3d 370, 206 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1984).
12. See infra notes 46-63 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 114-33 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 148-72 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
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anti-discrimination interest.23 Finally, the diminished protection af-
forded commercial association and the special protection for religious
association will be discussed.2" Suggestions will be offered for the treat-
ment of associations of a mixed commercial and religious character.25
A concrete factual situation will help to clarify the discussion that
follows. The facts of Pines v. Tomson provide an appropriate start-
ing point.
Pines v. Tomson
In Pines v. Tomson, the publisher of a business telephone directory
known as the Christian Yellow Pages (CYP) was sued under the Unruh
Civil Rights Act2 6 by a Jewish businessman whose advertisement was
refused by the publication.27 The avowed purpose of the directory
was to serve the Christian community by providing listings of businesses
operated by Christians for those desiring to do business with other
born-again Christians. 28 Included in the directory was a "concept state-
ment" setting out the religious beliefs of the publishers and the pur-
pose for publishing the directory. 29 Included with the concept state-
ment was a statement of the publisher's policy of accepting advertis-
ing only from those who were willing to sign an oath stating they
are born-again Christians. 30 Since the plaintiff would not sign the writ-
ten oath, the publishers refused to publish his advertisement.'
A three-judge appellate panel held that the conduct of the publisher
was discrimination on the basis of religion and upheld an injunction
against further use of the signed oath as a basis of accepting
advertising.3 2 The panel, however, reversed an order enjoining publica-
tion of the statement of religious belief, ruling that the order
represented a prior restraint upon first amendment speech.3 3 In defense,
the CYP claimed the application of the anti-discrimination statute
unduly interfered with the constitutional freedom of association, free
speech, and free exercise of religion.34 The appellate panel took note
23. See infra notes 189-211 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 214-38 and accompanying text.
25. See id.
26. CAL. CIV. CODE §§51, 51.5.
27. Pines, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 377, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
28. Id. at 375, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 377, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
32. Id. at 388-92, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 877-80.
33. Id. at 392-98, 206 Cal. Rptr at 880-84.
34. Id. at 379, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
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of the stated religious purpose of the publication, but held that_the
injunction against use of the oath did not interfere materially with
the accomplishment of that religious purpose." Consequently, no free
exercise analysis was undertaken.36
In addressing the freedom of association claim, the court conceded
the order infringed upon associational rights by requiring the publishers
to do business with non-Christians despite a contrary preference."
The court found the infringement justified by the compelling interest
of the state in eradicating invidious discrimination.38 Furthermore, the
court ruled that the injunction achieved that interest by the least restric-
tive means possible."9
The discussion by the court of the free speech interest was limited
to a ruling that the injunction against publication of the CYP concept
statement constituted an impermissible prior restraint of speech."' Rely-
ing upon the trial court finding that the CYP activities constituted
secular commercial conduct for profit,4 1 the court stated that the
discriminatory practices of the publisher, as opposed to the expres-
sion of views, were not entitled to free speech protection. 2 Conse-
quently, conduct of the CYP in excluding advertisements by
non-Christians was not viewed by the court as raising a free speech
issue.
The court in Pines recognized that the problems posed by the case
involved distinguishing between "difficult and opposing views in a
field of substantial uncertainty." 43 Although the case presents gray
areas, the existing case law and literature are not without guidelines.
The initial question to be explored is the nature of the state interest
in preventing discrimination.
STATE PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAW
As a general rule, state law provides the most effective and suitable
means of enforcing anti-discrimination policies. Initially, many state
public accommodations laws were enacted to fill the statutory gap
created when federal public accommodations law was struck down
35. Id. at 388-89, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
36. Id. at 390, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
37. Id. at 391, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
38. Id. at 391-92, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
39. Id. at 392, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 879-80.
40. Id. at 392-97, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 880-84.
41. Id. at 393 n.12, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 880 n.12.
42. Id. at 393, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
43. Id. at 400, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
44. Survey, supra note 3, at 287.
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in the Civil Rights Cases.45 Today, however, the reach of federal public
accommodations law has been aided greatly by expanding judicial
interpretation of the commerce clause. 6 In the two test cases of the
public accommodations section of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 7 the
United States Supreme Court upheld the legislation based upon the
federal commerce power.48 Proponents of the legislation argued that
the fourteenth amendment provided a more appropriate foundation
for the Act.49 In addition, two concurring justices in the test cases
indicated a willingness to rely solely upon the fourteenth amendment
in upholding the public accommodations section.5"
The use of the fourteenth amendment as a basis, however, would
place considerable strain on the concept of state action required for
operation of the fourteenth amendment s.5 Although courts have shown
great willingness to expand the state action concept of the fourteenth
amendment in many areas,5 2 the application of the amendment to
public accommodations has been very limited.53 One reason the four-
teenth amendment has not gained strength in the public accommoda-
tions area is that the commerce clause makes an alternative rationale
unnecessary. 54 Congressional power to regulate public accommoda-
tions under the broad grant of the commerce clause has never really
45. Id. at 239.
46. See Survey, supra note 3, at 220 n.22 ("The courts have applied conventional com-
merce rationale to bring various accommodations under the Act, straining to find the requisite
effect"); L. CARorHES, THE PUBLic ACCOMMODATIONS LAW OF 1964: ARGUmENTS, ISSUES AND
ATTITUDEs IN A LEGAL DEBATE 23-36 (1968) (commerce clause basis for public accommodations
law of 1964).
47. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1965); Katzenback v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294 (1964).
48. See L. CARonSRs, supra note 46, at x.
49. Id. at 36.
50. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 279, 280 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at
293 (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also Survey, supra note 3, at 220 n.21.
51. L. CAROTrRS, supra note 46, at 36.
52. B. SCHMiDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS. PUBLic Accass 101 (1976). Congressional power
under the fourteenth amendment has been extended to private businesses that operate fran-
chises granted by the state, lease government property, or benefit from a state-granted power
of eminent domain. P. KAUPER, CIViL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 156-58 (1962). A grant
of financial assistance from the government may constitute state action if the assistance was
given in recognition of the public purpose served by the organization. Id. at 159. In addition,
state action has been found when a private association is permitted by the state to perform
functions that intrude upon an area of exclusive state responsibility. Id. at 159-60. See Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company-owned town), Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944) (significance of party primary in state election process implicates state action). Attempts
to link state licensing and other regulation of an enterprise to state action have been generally
rejected. P. KAUPER, supra, at 162.
53. Survey, supra note 3, at 220 (basic question of fact under federal public accommoda-
tions law is whether the accommodation affects commerce).
54. See L. TRINE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §5-15, 274-75 (1978).
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been questioned since the initial test cases." Furthermore, even with
the expansive use of the state action concept under the fourteenth
amendment, the Supreme Court has shown reluctance to broaden the
concept when nonracial discrimination is involved." The Court has
been equally reluctant to find state action in private conduct involv-
ing the exercise of first amendment rights.17
The thirteenth amendment, unlike the fourteenth, contains no state
action requirement." This amendment, however, is tied to the con-
cept of slavery. Although that term has been broadly construed by
the Supreme Court, 9 application of the thirteenth amendment beyond
discrimination based on race or national origin appears to be limited.6"
Consequently, federal regulation of discrimination in public accom-
modations rests firmly upon the commerce power rather than upon
the Civil War amendments that provide the basis of most other federal
anti-discrimination legislation. 6' Despite broad regulatory power under
the commerce clause, federal regulation of discrimination in public
accommodations remains limited. Federal law offers protection
primarily to victims of racial and ethnic discrimination and generally
applies to traditional places of public accommodation, as regulated
at common law.62 The reason for the modest scope of federal law
may lie in considerations of federalism and concern by Congress about
infringing upon areas of traditional state competence. 63
The scope of state public accommodations law, on the other hand,
often exceeds the scope of federal law both in the range of business
establishments covered and forms of discrimination prohibited. 64 Pro-
tection under state law is afforded not only from discrimination based
upon race, creed, color, religion, and national origin, but also from
discrimination upon the basis of sex, age or disability, and in some
55. Survey, supra note 3, at 220 (initial judicial reliance on commerce clause established
a pattern for all subsequent litigation).
56. B. SCHMIDT, supra note 52, at 101.
57. Id.
58. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 415 (2d ed. 1983).
59. See Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439-40 (1968) (thirteenth amendment
gives Congress power to determine what are the "badges and incidents of slavery" and to
effect legislation on that basis).
60. See General Building Contractor's Association, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375,
382-91 (1982) (federal law based on thirteenth amendment requires racially disciminatory in-
tent); L. TRIBE, supra note 54, at 261. But see Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)
(federal law based on thirteenth amendment requires racial "or otherwise class-based"
discrimination).
61. See Survey, supra note 3, at 220.
62. Survey, supra note 3, and accompanying text.
63. See id. at 287; L. TRIBE, supra note 54, at 261 n.24.
64. Survey, supra note 3, at 287-88. Compare 42 U.S.C. §2000a (1970) (Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964) with CAL. CiV. CODE §§51, 51.5 (Unruh Civil Rights Act).
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states, marital status, personal appearance and sexual preference. 5
Many of these laws contain broadly construed general language that
results in extensive coverage. 66
The power of the states to regulate public accommodations to this
extent represents a legitimate exercise of reserved'police power .6 Limits
placed upon state definitions of public accommodations by the United
States Supreme Court have involved statutory interpretation rather
than constitutional interpretation. 8 Since the Court first reviewed the
constitutionality of a state anti-discrimination statute,69 the right of
a state to actively promote equality in housing, employment, and public
accommodations has been clear.70 In California, the Unruh Civil Rights
Act contains one of the most expansive public accommodations laws
in the nation.' The scope of the law reaches beyond the traditional
public accommodations coverage of common carriers and places of
public recreation and accommodation to include "all business
establishments of every kind whatsoever." ' 72 In addition, the California
definition of public accommodations is the most broadly interpreted
general definition among state public accommodations laws. 73 Califor-
nia courts have read "business establishment" to embrace all com-
mercial and non-commercial entities open to and serving the general
public. 4
The extensive regulation of public accommodations in California
and other states illustrates the broad scope of the reserved power of
the states. Neither the state police power nor federal commerce power,
however, is free from the restrictions of other constitutional provi-
sions. Rather, the Bill of Rights stands as a limitation on both
Congressional and state power to enforce public accommodations law."
Since the state interest in public accommodations legislation must rely
solely upon the reserved state police power, the "preferred" rights
65. See Survey, supra note 3, at 260-71.
66. Id. at 242.
67. Henkin, supra note 4, at 488-89.
68. Survey, supra note 3, at 240.
69. See Railway Mail Assoc. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 89 (1945) (challenge to New York
law prohibiting discrimination by labor unions in admission of members).
70. Henkin, supra note 4, at 489.
71. CONFERENCE ON DISCRwiNATION AND THE LAW 92 (V. Countryman ed. 1963).
72. See CAL. Cr. CODE §§51, 51.5.
73. Survey, supra note 3, at 242.
74. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of Boy Scouts, 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 732-33, 195
Cal. Rptr. 325, 332-33 (1983).
75. The power of Congress to enforce the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amend-
ments is restricted by the Bill of Rights. L. TRmE. supra note 54, §5-12, 257. The state may
prohibit discrimination in all establishments until a constitutionally-based privacy interest sur-
faces. Survey, supra note 3, at 287.
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of the first amendment may present a strong challenge to state
authority to regulate discrimination.
Weighing first amendment claims against anti-discrimination law,
courts consistently have characterized the governmental interest in
preventing discrimination as compelling. 6 In upholding federal public
accommodations law, the United States Supreme Court recognized
the need to vindicate "the deprivation of personal dignity that surely
accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments.""' At
the same time, however, invidious private discrimination, particularly
private racial discrimination, never has been accorded affirmative con-
stitutional protection."2
Cases involving racial discrimination in traditional places of public
accommodation may be of limited value, however, in balancing many
first amendment claims with modern state public accommodations
statutes. When racial discrimination occurs in public accommodations,
the individual liberty interest of the owner often is minimal."9 In situa-
tions involving nonracial discrimination, the state interest may diminish
while the legitimacy of the first amendment interest increases. Conse-
quently, the analysis found in cases involving racial discrimination
may not be appropriate."'
In addition, the interest of the state in regulation of public accom-
modations may become increasingly tenuous in states with broad defini-
tions of public accommodations. A modified state action concept often
appears in the analysis of state public accommodations legislation,
in which the "public character" of the establishment affects the weight
of the private interest."' The public character idea reflects the rationale
for common law regulation of inns and common carriers.8 " The owner
of such facilities was deemed to be engaged in "quasi-public" ser-
vice, because the property was put to a use in which the public had
an interest." A similar public character view of state action was
advanced unsuccessfully as a means of tying federal public accom-
76. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3255 (1984); EEOC v. Mississippi
College, 626 F.2d 477, 488 (5th Cir. 1980).
77. Roberts, 104 S. Ct. at 3253 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 250 (1964)).
78. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973).
79. B. ScManMr, supra note 52, at 101.
80. Id.
81. See Roberts, 104 S. Ct. at 3248-49. The same consideration of public nature appears
in the analysis of legislation based on the thirteenth amendment, which requires no state ac-
tion. See McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1088 (4th Cir. 1975) aff'd 427 U.S. 160 (1975).
82. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 37-42 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 42.
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modations law to the fourteenth amendment. 4 Under this view, the
purpose of restaurants, theatres and hotels is the public purpose of
making a profit, which indicates that all paying customers will be
accepted.85 In this context, racial or other discrimination among
customers is unreasonable because such differences are irrelevant to
the purpose for which the facilities operate. 6
The appropriate object of public accommodations law, according
to the public character approach, is an establishment in which minimal
association exists between proprietor and customers, and in which the
service relation is brief, casual and routine. 7 In addition, the establish-
ment provides a service necessary to the public, and a high degree
of competition exists among establishments of the same kind.88
Typically, public accommodations cater to nearly all of the public,
indicating that significant associational interests are nonexistent.8 9
Statutory interpretation of state public accommodations law often
reflects this public character view, excluding organizations of a more
private nature from coverage.9" Although state action is not required
for the state to regulate discrimination in public accommodations,
the legal weight clearly shifts from the state interest toward the
individual first amendment interest as the nature of the establishment
becomes more private.
Under many modern state statutes, particularly in California, the
definition of public accommodations includes establishments that may
be of a marginal public character under this doctrine. 9' In applying
the public character idea to Pines, a court might conclude that the
character of the establishment is sufficiently private to increase the
first amendment interest and diminish the strength of the state interest.
The publication in Pines clearly indicates that the enterprise does not
intend to accept all paying advertisers? 2 The directory is aimed at
a specific segment of the population, with at least a partial purpose
of furthering religious association among the customers of the
business.93 Unlike the telephone company yellow pages, the CYP is
not a necessary service relied upon by the general public. The focus
84. L. CARoTRRs, supra note 46, at 43; see Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 275
(1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).
85. L. CARoTHERs, supra note 46, at 10.
86. Id. at 11.
87. CONFERENCE ON DISCRImNATION AND THE LAW, supra note 71, at 90.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 91.
90. See Survey, supra note 3, at 241-43.
91. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
92. See Pines, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 375, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 868-69.
93. See id.
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on a specific group of consumers limits the degree of direct competi-
tion with the customary yellow pages.
An analysis of the state interest in public accommodations law, then,
requires more than a summary conclusion that the interest is com-
pelling. The legitimacy of state power to prevent discrimination is
unquestioned, and state law provides an effective vehicle for dealing
with the problem of discrimination in public accommodations.9" Many
variables, however, can affect the proper weight to be accorded the
state interest. The broad scope of state public accommodations law
may extend to establishments and forms of discrimination traditionally
not subject to regulation. In addition, state public accommodations
law is subject to the restrictions of the Bill of Rights, and the presence
of first amendment rights in opposition to the state interest requires
consideration of those constitutional protections. In a conflict of public
accommodations law and first amendment rights, the primary ques-
tion may concern the legitimacy and importance of the claimed con-
stitutional rights rather than the compelling nature of the state interest.
Constitutional claims of freedom of speech or press provide good ex-
amples of constitutional interests that often take precedence over a
strong state interest.
PRESS FREEDOM AND THE RIGHT OF ACCESS
When the legislature attempts directly to suppress or limit the content
of speech, freedom of speech approaches the status of an absolute
right. 9s Direct speech restrictions are presumed unconstitutional. 96 The
presumption against this type of speech restriction was undoubtedly
the basis of the Pines court refusal to enjoin publication of the CYP
concept statement.9 7 The concept statement was a published expres-
sion of religious belief and the trial court order directly suppressed
that expression. 8
State public accommodations law, on the other hand, fits into the
category of non-speech restrictions,99 the purpose of which is to attain
some state purpose other than the direct restriction of speech.'10 The
non-speech restriction involves an incidental restriction of com-
94. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
95. M. NIMIER, NIMMER ON FREE SPEECH, §2.05[A], 2-28 to 2-29 (1984).
96. Id. at §2.05[A], 2-28.
97. Pines, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 395-98, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 882-84.
98. Id. at 882.
99. See M. NIMMER, supra note 95, §2.04 at 2-25.
100. Id.
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municative conduct, rather than restriction of the message conveyed.' 0 '
In a conflict between a speech interest and a non-speech restriction
like public accommodations law, the non-speech interest ordinarily
will outweigh the speech claim. 2 The result in Pines would be
consistent with that general rule if the conduct of CYP in refusing
the advertisement had been a speech interest. A publisher's rejection
of an advertisement for publication, however, is conduct that implicates
freedom of the press, rather than freedom of speech. 03
The right of a publisher to exclude material is unique in that two
layers of first amendment rights are involved: the right of the in-
dividual to have access to a forum for speech, and the editorial right
of the publisher to exclude certain material from publication.0 4 The
former is a speech interest, and the latter is a press interest.0 5 By
failing to distinguish sufficiently between these two interests, the Pines
court is in good company. The United States Supreme Court, in assess-
ing access claims and editorial rights, often has subsumed the speech
and press interests in a single free speech analysis. 6 These cases never-
theless indicate that the Court may accord more weight to press in-
terests than to speech interests. 0 7
The interesting and difficult problem of access to a publication lies
in the fact that the first amendment encompasses potentially conflicting
principles of individual autonomy and diversity of expression. 8 An
access right would be consistent with the traditional first amendment
ideal of a free marketplace of ideas, which encourages the free play
and competition of ideas.' °9 In general, however, the first amend-
ment espouses guarantees of autonomy,"' as illustrated by Justice
Black's statement that the primary reason for the first amendment
is to guarantee freedom to think, speak, and worship as the individual
wishes, not as government commands.' More clearly than any other
101. Id.
102. Id. §2.06 at 2-85.
103. See infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text. An initial question is whether a publication
like the CYP can claim a press right. Chief Justice Burger has suggested that the press clause
"comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion".
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 799-800 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurr-
ing). The primary limitation upon application of the press clause seems to be the requirement
of broad publication of material. See id.; M. NIMMER, supra note 95, at §2.081D] at 2-120.
104. See M. NIMIER, supra note 95, §2.08[B] at 2-111 to 2-113.
105. Id.
106. See generally id., §2.08 at 2-104 to 2-129 (analysis of Supreme Court cases involving
both speech and press interests).
107. Id.
108. B. SCHMIDT, supra note 52, at 28.
109. Id. at 29.
110. Id. at 35.
111. International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 788 (1961).
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problem of free expression, the issue of access rights to a private
publication demonstrates the tension between individual autonomy and
equality. " 12
The editorial function protected ly the first amendment has been
described as the choice of material for publication, decisions as to
size, layout and organization, and decisions concerning treatment of
public issues and public officials." 3 Editorial rights and the opposing
rights of access are subject to differing standards of analysis depend-
ing upon whether they occur in the context of print media or broad-
cast media. Consequently, an examination of these rights must be
divided into separate discussions of the right of access to print media
and the right of access to broadcast media.
A. Right of Access to Broadcast Media
Certain public rights of access to broadcast media have been
recognized by the United States Supreme Court. In Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, "4 the Court approved the FCC "fairness
doctrine," under which broadcasters are required to grant individuals
the right to reply to personal attacks aired by the station, and the
right to reply to the political editorials of a station."' The rationale
advanced in Red Lion for the distinction between a right of access to
the print media and a right of access to broadcast media was that
the number of newspapers and magazines that are publishable
theoretically is infinite, while the broadcast airwaves are technologically
limited."' The limited nature of broadcast opportunities justifies the
power of the FCC to grant licenses for the broadcast privilege and
to require broadcasters to share assigned frequencies to a limited
extent.' '7 The electronic media in essence constitute a legal monopoly."'
Although newspapers may enjoy a natural monopoly in the sense that
most market areas will not support more than one daily newspaper,"
other newspapers legally are not barred from using the same market
area. 120
In Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National
112. B. SCHIMDT, supra note 52, at 4.
113. Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
114. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
115. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 at 386-401 (1969).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, supra note 58, at 903.
119. B. ScHMnmT, supra note 52, at 51-52.
120. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, supra note 58, at 903.
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Committee,"2' however, the Court made clear that in the absence of
a specific FCC requirement of access,' 22 the first amendment does
not require a broadcaster to provide access. In sharp contrast to Red
Lion, a majority of the Court seemed skeptical of, if not hostile to,
access requirements for the broadcast media, criticizing them as
contrary to the spirit of the first amendment. 23 In combination, the
Red Lion and CBS decisions indicate that no constitutionally pro-
tected right of access to the broadcast media exists. The issue of
whether the broadcaster has a constitutionally protected right of ex-
clusion, however, was not addressed by the cases. In contrast, the
right of the print media to exclude material from publication has receiv-
ed broad constitutional protection.
B. Print Media Access
In privately owned print media, freedom of the press presents a
virtually insurmountable barrier to government regulation.,24 Publishers
enjoy almost total freedom to refuse or accept material as they wish.
The breadth of autonomy granted privately owned print media is
exemplified by the principal Supreme Court decision on access rights,
Miami Herald v. Tornillo.125  In Miami Herald, the newspaper
,challenged a Florida statute providing a limited right to reply to
political newspaper editorials.' 26 The Court unequivocally concluded
that the basic constitutional guarantees of press and speech relate to
autonomy, rather than diversity of expression.' 27 The Florida statute
was struck down as an unconstitutional encroachment upon journalistic
discretion and an intrusion into the function of the editor.28
Additional protection for the editorial function in the face of a
121. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
122. Id. at 123.
123. Id. at 120-60. See B. SCHnIDT, supra note 52, at 180-81.
124. See Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 259 (1974) (White, J., concurring). Public
school newspapers and other state-owned print media may constitute public forums, requiring
public access rights in some circumstances. See, e.g., Lee v. Board of Regents, 441 F.2d 1257,
1260 (7th Cir. 1971) (state university newspaper that had accepted some political advertising
could not reject political advertisements relating to racism and Vietnam War); Zucker v. Panitz,
299 F. Supp. 102, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (high school newspaper open to free expression of
political ideas could not reject student advertisement opposing Vietnam War); Radical Lawyers
Caucus v. Pool, 324 F. Supp. 268, 270 (W.D. Tex. 1970) (state Bar Journal prohibited by
first amendment from refusing to accept advertisement for Radical Lawyers Caucus meeting).
But see, Avins v. Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151, 153-54 (3d Cir. 1967) (rejection of article submitted
to state university law journal involved protected exercise of editorial judgment despite fact
that law review receives state funds).
125. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
126. Id. at 243.
127. Id at 249-58. See B. SCHMIDT, supra note 52, at 234.
128. Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 258.
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strong government interest was found in Yablonski v. United Mine
Workers.' 2 In Yablonski, an official union publication was found
to violate federal labor law by failing to give equal coverage to both
candidates for the union presidency.' 30 The court ordered the journal
to provide fair and comparable treatment of the candidates, but ruled
that requiring publication of materials provided by Yablonski would
be a clear violation of the first amendment freedom of the press.",
When the journal failed to comply with the court order, the same
court resisted further judicial action despite a federal statute clearly
justifying enforcement of the order.' 32 The refusal of the court to
take further action was based on the view that a court should not
take control of a news publication by instructing an editor what can
and cannot be printed.' 33
Certain similarities between Yablonski and Pines invite comparison.
The union journal was published for the limited purpose of providing
information relating to union business, and aimed at a limited audience
of union readers. The CYP similarly was aimed at a specific interest
group, with a purpose related to the religious nature of the group.
The union journal refused material integrally related to the purpose
of the publication, despite a statute requiring fair and equal treat-
ment of union candidates. The CYP, on the other hand, refused
material that did not conform to the purpose of the publication.
Although the legal basis for access to the union journal was very
strong and the refusal appeared arbitrary, the court deferred to the
editorial rights of the newspaper. Consequently, the decision provides
strong support for the action of the CYP, in which the exclusion
was related directly to the purpose of the publication.
The exercise of editorial rights in Pines, however, raises a number
of questions not present in Yablonski and Miami Herald. First, the
exclusion in Pines was on the basis of religion, a factor traditionally
associated with invidious discrimination. Second, Pines involved the
exclusion of commercial advertising by a publication having a largely
commercial content. Finally, the CYP has an asserted religious purpose.
The effect of each of these characteristics upon the protection af-
forded by the first amendment must be analyzed.
129. 305 F. Supp. 868 (D.C.D.C. 1969).
130. Id. at 875. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 requires
labor union management to refrain from discrimination in favor of any candidates. 29 U.S.C.
§481(c).
131. Yablonski, 305 F. Supp. at 872.
132. Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 307 F. Supp. 1226, 1227 (D.C.D.C. 1969).
133. Id.
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C. The Nature of the Discrimination-Effect upon Editorial Rights
The particular type of discrimination practiced appears to make
no difference in the outcome of cases involving rights of access and
editorial rights. In Miami Herald, the Court indicated that the first
amendment protects the exercise of editorial functions, whether fair
or unfair.1 34 The breadth of this protection is illustrated clearly in
Cook v. Advertiser Co.,' 35 in which an Alabama newspaper was sued
under federal civil rights statutes for refusing to print the wedding
announcements of blacks in the society section of the paper. ' 36 Assum-
ing the statute could reach private action, the district court ruled that
the constitutional right of the newspaper to be free from judicial in-
terference in the selection of announcements for publication far
outweighed the statutory right of the plaintiffs. 37 Although the court
of appeals did not reach the question of editorial rights,' 31 the con-
curring opinion 39 reaffirmed the view that the first amendment pro-
tects editorial discretion, "however perverse may be the manner of
its exercise. ''140
Although the editorial rights of the publisher in Cook were not
diminished by racially discriminatory conduct, the concurring opinion
indicated that the result might have been different if a commercial
advertisement rather than a wedding announcement had been
involved.' 4' A determination of the validity of that view requires a
closer look at the relationship between commercial speech and editorial
rights.
D. Effect of Commercial Content on Editorial Rights
In Pines, the appellate panel accepted the finding of the trial court
that the activity in question was secular commercial conduct for
profit.' 42 Relying upon that characterization, the panel concluded that
134. Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 258.
135. 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972).
136. Id. at 1120. The announcements of blacks instead were printed on a "Negro News"
page of the paper. Id.
137. Id. at 1121.
138. The action was brought under 42 U.S.C. §1981, which prohibits discrimination in the
making of contracts. Id. The court ruled that no contractual rights were implicated in the
action. Id. at 1121-22.
139. The concurrence stated the view that the transaction ordinarily might amount to a
contract, but a promise by a newspaper to print any particular item of news would be constitu-
tionally unenforceable, as a violation of editorial rights. Id. at 1123. (Wisdom, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 1124. (Wisdom, J., concurring).
141. Id.
142. Pines, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 393 & n.12, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 880 & n.12.
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the discriminatory practices of the CYP, as opposed to the expres-
sion of views, were not entitled to free speech protection.'"3 If the
court had recognized the issue as one of freedom of press, the
characterization by the trial court would have raised the issue whether
the commercial purpose and content of the publication diminishes the
constitutional protection of editorial rights.
The commercial purpose of the CYP is irrelevant to a free press
analysis. The Supreme Court clearly has rejected the significance of
profit motive to press claims, indicating that this basis for regulation
would be incompatible with the first amendment.'44 That conclusion
requires only the recognition that newspapers and books are sold for
profit,'45 and that all aspects of any publication may be conducted
with a view toward increased sales.' 46 The inappropriateness of a profit
test to first amendment speech and press is clear.' 47
The commercial speech content of the CYP presents a more dif-
ficult problem. The effect of commercial content upon a right of access
has received varying treatment in the case law. The concurring justice
in Cook expressed the view that editorial discretion involves the deter-
mination of what is newsworthy.' 48 He stated that commercial adver-
tising is commerce rather than news, implying that the rejection of
commercial advertisements is not an exercise of the editorial function.' 49
In cases involving private newspapers refusing to publish adver-
tisements, the case law is in clear conflict with the concurrence in
Cook. In a long history of cases, all but one have upheld the right
of the newspaper to refuse the advertisement.' "' The attempt in Cook
to link editorial discretion to commercial speech doctrines presents
another example of the need to separate speech and press interests
carefully in access cases.' When a private newspaper refuses adver-
tisements, the interest of the newspaper remains an interest in the
exercise of the editorial function, just as in any other media access
case. Only the speech interest of the advertiser has changed to a com-
143. Id. at 393, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
144. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Human Relations Commission, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1974).
145. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
146. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. 376 at 385.
147. Id.
148. Cook v. Advertiser Company, 458 F.2d 1119, 1124 (5th Cir. 1972) (Wisdom, J.,
concurring).
149. Id.
150. B. SCMDT, supra note 52, at 108. The one exception was decided in 1919 and did
not consider the press issue, because the first amendment had not yet been held applicable
to the states. Id. See Uhlman v. Sherman, 31 Ohio Dec. 54, 62 (Defiance C.P. 1919).
151. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
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mercial one. If a newspaper editor has the right to refuse access for
political and editorial speech concerning important public issues, the
right of the editor to refuse speech with less first amendment value
should not be questioned.' 52
One case, however, does provide a link between the editorial judg-
ment of a newspaper and commercial content. In Pittsburgh Press
v. Pittsburgh Human Rights Commission,5 3 a sharply divided Supreme
Court 54 found that the placement of want ads in sex-designated
columns in a newspaper combined with discriminatory advertisements
to form "an integrated commercial statement."' 5 The ads themselves
discriminated on the basis of sex and, according to the Court, the
decision of the newspaper to place the advertisements in a
discriminatory format conveyed essentially the same message as an
overtly discriminatory want ad. s6 The Court declined, however, to
decide the case on commercial speech grounds. Under a city ordinance
specifically prohibiting employers from placing discriminatory adver-
tisements, the advertisements were illegal, and the combination of
editorial discretion and advertisement consequently became an illegal
package, not entitled to first amendment protection.'57
Lower courts have interpreted Pittsburgh Press primarily as a narrow
ruling against the publication of commercial advertisements that pro-
pose an illegal transaction. 58 These cases indicate that the proper focus
under Pittsburgh Press is the legality of the transaction proposed by
the advertising.' Even if the idea of an "integrated commercial state-
ment" were accepted, the case does not stand for the proposition
that a newspaper loses a degree of first amendment press protection
every time a commercial advertisement is printed. Under Pittsburgh
Press, for editorial conduct to be placed in the same category as com-
mercial speech, the conduct itself must convey a message identical
to that conveyed by the advertisement. 6 ' Outside of the unique facts
152. See B. SCH1MUDT, supra note 52, at 50; Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co.,
440 F.2d 133, 136 (9th Cir. 1976).
153. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
154. The Court split 5-4, with Justices Douglas, Blackmun, Stewart, and Chief Justice Burger
dissenting. See Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Human Relations Commission, 413 U.S. 376,
393-405 (1973).
155. Id. at 388.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 389.
158. See Lamar Outdoor Advertising v. Mississippi State Tax Commission, 701 F.2d 314,
320-23 (5th Cir. 1983) (discussion of Pittsburgh Press unlawful activity exception to first amend-
ment protection and subsequent cases).
159. Lamar, 701 F.2d at 321.
160. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 388.
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of Pittsburgh Press, the merging of editorial conduct and commer-
cial content is difficult to imagine.' 6 ' In the absence of such an oc-
currence, a newspaper is free under present law to refuse any
advertiser.' 62
If the mere publication of commercial advertising does not diminish
the editorial rights of a newspaper, arguably the press rights of the
publisher of a business directory are not reduced to the level of
commercial speech by the commercial content of the publication.
Assuming, however, that a business directory is in some way inherently
different than a newspaper with respect to editorial protection, the
application of commercial speech analysis is unlikely to deprive the
publisher of the right to exclude advertising. As an initial proposi-
tion, commercial speech doctrine does not translate easily to editorial
rights. The common thread in commercial speech cases is the issue
of whether commercial speech can be banned or abridged by the
government.' 63 In press access cases, a private individual, rather than
the government, is abridging speech, and the first amendment is not
addressed to abridgement by private individuals.' 6 In Pines, the state
actually is attempting to compel the publication of commercial speech
by limiting the editorial freedom to reject advertisments.
The modern Supreme Court view of commercial speech was set out
in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council.'65
The Court recognized first amendment protection for commercial
speech by focusing on the individual parties to the transaction and
the particular interests that they brought to the speech issue.' 66 Using
the Virginia Pharmacy model to analyze Pines, four interests can be
delineated: (1) the interest of the advertiser in promoting his business
and product, (2) the interest of the publisher in maintaining editorial
control, (3) the interest of the consumer in receiving information, and
161. Whether "commercial integration" actually occurred in Pittsburgh Press is subject to
question. According to the Court, the message conveyed by both the advertisements and the
editorial conduct was one of discrimination in hiring practices. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at
387-88. As such, the conduct conveyed the illegal message of the advertisements, rather than
the commercial message. Id.
162. See B. ScHMIDT, supra note 52, at 49.
163. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (ordinance against distribution
*of commercial advertising matter in the streets); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 812-13
(1975) (state statute barring advertisements for abortion services); Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 749-50 (1976) (rule deeming advertisement
of drug prices by licensed pharmacist unprofessional conduct).
164. The California Constitution, however, has been interpreted to require a property owner
in some circumstances to provide a forum for speech of others. See PruneYard Shopping Center
v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
165. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
166. Id. at 762.
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(4) the interest of the state in preventing discrimination. In Virginia
Pharmacy, the interest of the consumer in receiving commercial
information was the pivotal factor favoring first amendment protec-
tion of commercial speech.' 67 One reason for the traditional protec-
tion of newspapers is the importance of providing the public with
information regarding current events and political affairs, thus enabling
informed public decision-making.' 68 In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court
also recognized the importance of informed commercial decisions to
the economic welfare of the nation, observing that receipt of com-
mercial information can be as vital or more vital to an individual
than receipt of political, social or literary speech.
169
The probable consumer group for the advertisements in the CYP
is one with an interest in religious association. A statement in the
directory emphasizes that the goods and services offered are not
necessarily less expensive or of higher quality than others in the
market;'7 the directory is provided for those who wish to "live their
faith" by doing business with Christian businessmen.' 7 ' The interest
of this audience in receiving Pines' advertisement would be minimal.
The interest of the general public in receiving the advertisement is
diminished by the fact that alternative forums exist for the publica-
tion of the plaintiff's commercial advertisement.' 72
From the standpoint of commercial speech analysis, then, the crucial
interest of the consumer weighs in favor of the right of the editor
to exclude the advertisement. The reason for this conclusion is that
the interests of the readers coincide with the interests of the editor
rather than the interests of the advertiser. The religious beliefs of the
readers are clearly an influence in determining the effect of the
commercial content upon constitutional protections. The religious
content and the asserted religious purpose of the publication may also
affect first amendment protection independent of the commercial
speech question.
E. Religious Purpose - Effect on Editorial Rights
If the commercial nature of the publication can affect the protec-
tion given to editorial judgment, religious content also will have an
167. Id. at 763.
168. Id. at 762.
169. See M. NIMIER, supra note 95, §1.02[H] at 1-44 to 1-46.
170. Pines, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 376, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
171. Id. at 388, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
172. But see Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 757 n.15. "We are aware of no general princi-
ple that freedom of speech may be abridged when the speaker's listeners could come by his
message by some other means." Id.
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effect upon the strength of the editorial right. The CYP contains a
substantial amount of religious expression. Aside from the statement
of religious belief and purpose in each directory,' 7 Christian proverbs,
symbols, and Biblical quotations appear throughout the directory. 74
The United States Supreme Court has been particularly astute in
protecting the freedom of religious expression. 75 In one of many cases
involving the activities of Jehovah's Witnesses, a flat tax on solicita-
tion within city limits was held invalid as applied to the Jehovah's
Witnesses, because their commercial activities were merely incidental
and collateral to the main object of publicizing their religious
doctrines. 76 In the context of a right of access, the effect of religious
expression is equally important. If the Jehovah's Witnesses or any
other religious group published material espousing particular religious
views, common sense dictates that they should not be required to
provide access for other religious groups to espouse opposing religious
views. 77 Common sense in this instance is bolstered by a line of free
speech cases ruling that the first amendment is violated when
individuals are forced to disseminate or recite ideological views that
are opposed to their own beliefs.'78
Although a question may be raised regarding whether the com-
mercial aspects of the CYP diminish first amendment protection,
modern commercial speech analysis indicates little or no effect upon
the editorial right of the publisher. The religious aspects of the publica-
tion strengthen the first amendment interests. The combination of the
extreme judicial deference to the exercise of editorial rights and the
religious purpose for publishing the directory indicates that the anti-
discrimination interest should not prevail over the first amendment
claim. Similar judicial deference may be lacking in relation to claims
of the constitutional right of association. Clear grounds do exist,
however, for the protection of associational interest, even when the
interest conflicts with an anti-discrimination statute.
173. Pines at 375, 206 Cal. Rptr at 868.
174. Id. at 376, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
175. P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CoNsTITunoN 39 (1964).
176. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943).
177. See B. SCHMIDT, supra note 52, at 31.
178. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1977). In Wooley, the Court found
that the right to speak out on ideological causes implied a concomitant right to decline to
foster causes. Id. at 714. See also, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (compulsory recitation of flag salute by school children in violation of
religious beliefs is unconstitutional); Cantor, Constitutional Interests in Ideological Non-
Association, 36 RUTGERS L. REv. 3, 15-18 (1983).
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FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT To EXCLUDE
Freedom of association is raised frequently as a constitutional issue
in cases challenging the application of anti-discrimination law.'7 9 Often,
however, the invocation of this right has been rejected by the courts.
Many courts have found the prevention of discrimination to be a com-
pelling state interest that cannot be accomplished without placing
restrictions on associational rights. 8 Freedom of association, however,
is not necessarily relegated to the position of a secondary right that
will never carry sufficient weight to prevail over the state anti-
discrimination interest. Decisions denying associational claims indicate
circumstances under which the freedom of association can outweigh
the anti-discrimination interest.
Freedom of association long has played a pivotal role in political
and social life in America. 8 ' Protection has been given to the right
to associate in the belief that the fundamental freedoms expressly
guaranteed by the Constitution could not be protected adequately
without a corresponding protection of group effort in the pursuit of
these fundamental freedoms.' 8 2 Consequently, the right to associate
has been regarded as a fundamental liberty,'83 frequently described
as one of the preferred rights of the first amendment." 4
Concurrent with the right to associate exists a right not to associate,
which includes the first amendment interest of an association in not
being forced to accept unwanted members."' This right to exclude
members necessarily recognizes a protected right to practice discrimina-
tion and is the associational interest most likely to come into conflict
with the rights of access created by public accommodations law.
Application of the law to groups with associational interests represents
a state intrusion into the internal affairs of an association, an action
courts traditionally have been reluctant to take." 6 The balance between
the anti-discrimination interest and the right of nonassociation was
the subject of two Supreme Court cases in the 1984 term, in which
179. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 2235 (1984); Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3246 (1984); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175 (1975).
180. See Roberts, 104 S. Ct. it 3255.
181. D. FELLMAN, Tim CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION 1-2 (1963). See I A. DE To-
QUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 242 (2d ed. 1863).
182. Roberts, 104 S. Ct. at 3252.
183. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972); Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen
v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
184. L. TRIBE, supra note 54, §12-23 at 700.
185. See P. KAUPER, supra note 52, at 104-06.
186. See De'velopments in the Law; Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations,
76 HARv. L. REv. 983, 986-91 (1963).
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anti-discrimination law was upheld over the associational right." 7
Within these two cases and other important right of association cases,
the Court has established certain guidelines for determining when the
first amendment freedom of association will outweigh the public
accommodations interest.' s
A. Criteria for Protected Association
The initial concern in measuring an associational interest is the
purpose of the association. The first amendment does not give a
blanket protection to all forms of association.'8 9 The constitutional
right of association protects only association for the pursuit of other
independently protected first amendment rights such as political
advocacy, litigation, religious worship, or literary expression.' 90 The
characterization of the purpose of an organization, then, can be of
critical importance. The activities of a nonprofessional organization
in promoting litigation or lawyer referral has been characterized as
a form of political expression that outweighs the state interest in
regulating legal activities.' 9' At the same time, nonprofessional
organizations promoting medical services have been denied the same
constitutional protection, because health maintenance is unconnected
to a concrete first amendment right. 92 In the same way, associations
of homosexuals long were denied constitutional recognition because
courts consistently related the purpose of the associations to sexual
conduct, which is unprotected by the first amendment. 93 As more
courts begin to characterize these organizations as associations for
the discussion of common problems and advocacy of political change,
first amendment protection is given more readily. 94
187. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984); Hishon v. King & Spalding,
104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984).
188. See infra notes 189-211 and accompanying text.
189. D. KNUTSON, HOMOSExUALITY AND TnE LAW 147-48 (1980); see also, L. TRIBE, supra
note 54, §12-23 at 701. The more personal forms of association are protected, if at all, as
rights of privacy or personhood. Id. But see Roberts, 104 S. Ct. at 3249 (treating rights of
"intimate association" as a first amendment right of association).
190. D. KNUTSON, supra note 189, at 147.
191. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-30 (1963); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1964).
192. Garcia v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners, 384 F. Supp. 434, 440 (W.D.
Tex. 1974), aff'd 421 U.S. 995 (1975). See L. TaB, supra note 54, §12-23 at 702.
193. D. KNUTSON, supra note 189, at 148. See Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536
F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976), in which the court denied the associational interest of a group pro-
viding counseling, legal aid and social activities for homosexuals, on the ground that the for-
mation of the association in itself would lead to the violation of state sodomy laws. Id. at
1075, 1076.
194. D. KNUTSON, supra note 189, at 148-49.
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In the application of public accommodations law and other anti-
discrimination law, the public character of an association becomes
a second important consideration. An association that actively solicits
membership from the general public has a more public nature than
one employing selective criteria in admissions. 19s Organizations with
a plan or purpose of exclusiveness may apply criteria for exclusion,
even though the incidental result is exclusion of a particular group. 96
In fact, purely private social organizations can limit membership on
racial or any other grounds.197
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 9 the public nature of the
Jaycees was a pivotal factor in the denial of associational claims. 99
Local chapters of the Jaycees were large and basically unselective
groups, admitting any male applicant between the ages of eighteen
and thirty-five. 200 The Minnesota Supreme Court observed that the
Kiwanis Club, unlike the Jaycees, was a purely private organization
and not subject to state public accommodations law. 2 ' The distinc-
tion apparently referred to formal procedures utilized for choosing
members on the basis of specific and selective criteria.20 2
If an association has a legitimate first amendment purpose and a
private nature evidenced by selective criteria, a third requirement still
must be met: the selection criteria must be reasonably related to the
fulfillment of the first amendment purpose. This factor was an
important consideration in both Roberts and another 1984 discrimina-
tion case, Hishon v. King & Spalding."3 In Roberts, the Court found
the state interest compelling in view of the lack of evidence that the
content or impact of the first amendment activities of the organiza-
195. Compare McCrary, 515 F.2d at 1087-89 (privately owned school held out as open to
the public may not exclude black applicants solely on the basis of race) with Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171 (1971) (private social organization may limit membership
on the basis of race).
196. McCrary, 515 F.2d at 1088. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229,
236 (1969).
197. See Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 171; see also, 42 U.S.C. §2000a(e) (private club exemp-
tion from public accommodations section of federal Civil Rights Act); Runyon v. McCrary
427 U.S. 160, 167 (1975).
198. 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984).
199. Roberts, 104 S. Ct. at 3251 (Jaycees is a large association that generally admits all
applicants).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 3249.
202. Id. at 3256. The Court rejected the Jaycees' claim that the state supreme court had
failed to provide any criteria to distinguish between the Kiwanis and the Jaycees. Id. Eight
years earlier, in an equally ambiguous opinion, a New York court ruled that Kiwanis was not
"in its nature distinctly private" and thus not exempt from public accommodations law. Kiwanis
Club of Great Neck, Inc. v. Kiwanis International, 383 N.Y.S.2d 383, 393 (N.Y. App. Div.
1976). See Survey, supra note 3, at 252 n.263.
203. 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984).
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tion would be altered materially if women were admitted.0 4 The court
of appeals determined that the advocacy of political and social causes
constituted a substantial part of the activity of the Jaycees and ruled
that this first amendment purpose protected the right of the Jaycees
to select members.2"' The United State Supreme Court, however, linked
the selection criteria to the associational purpose by concluding that
the admission of women as voting members would not impede the
ability of the organization to pursue the protected activities or to
disseminate the preferred views of the association. 206 Citing the right
of political parties to protect themselves from intrusion by those with
opposing political views, the Court noted that the Jaycees still are
free to exclude individuals with ideologies or philosophies differing
from those of existing members. 2 7 The fact that women were allowed
to participate as associate members in all aspects of Jaycee activities
except voting and office-holding underscored the conclusion of the
Court.20 s
The same rationale was applied in Hishon, in which the partners
in a law firm claimed that application of federal anti-discrimination
law infringed upon their constitutional right of association. 2 9 Accept-
ing the assertion that the activities of lawyers make a distinct con-
tribution to the ideas and beliefs of society, the Court nevertheless
found no evidence that the prohibition of sex discrimination would
impair the ability of the firm to fulfill that function. z0 In the particular
case before the Court, then, the characteristics of race or sex were
not relevant to the decision to admit an individual as a partner. 21'
The application of these principles to Pines raises further questions.
The primary purpose of the CYP was to publish a directory. The
purpose of publication is protected under the first amendment freedom
of speech and press. The selection criteria of the directory were clearly
set out in the publication. Following a statement of Christian belief,
the publishers stated that "those whose advertisements appear in the
CYP directory have declared orally and in writing that this is their
position in Christ. ' 212 Based upon the statement in Roberts that
204. Roberts, 104 S. Ct. at 3254-55.
205. Id. at 3249.
206. Id. at 3254-55.
207. Id. at 3254. See also McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d at 1087 (4th Cir. 1975) (freedom
of association "would not ordinarily justify exclusion of others sharing the same beliefs and
ideas").
208. Roberts, 104 S. Ct. at 3254-55.
209. Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2235.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 2237 (Powell, J., concurring).
212. Pines, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 375, 206 Cal. Rptr at 868.
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associations may exclude those with incompatible ideologies and
beliefs, 213 this particular criteria for exclusion would appear to be
legitimate. In determining the appropriateness of the criteria to the
purpose, however, the combined commercial and religious nature of
the directory becomes an important issue.
B. Association for Commercial Purposes
The effect of a commercial purpose upon the associational right
was explored by Justice O'Connor in a concurring opinion in
Roberts.21 Justice O'Connor objected to the focus of the majority
upon finding a connection between the exclusion of members and the
expressive purpose of a group." 5 This focus, according to Justice
O'Connor, could allow commercial associations to gain protection from
anti-discrimination law simply by engaging in certain expressional
activities.2 '1 6 Recognizing that most associations have mixed commer-
cial and expressive purposes, Justice O'Connor suggested instead that
the degree of first amendment protection should depend upon whether
the association is engaged predominantly in commercial activity or
protected expression.2"7 The purpose of the association may be rele-
vant to that determination. For example, the Supreme Court has pro-
tected legal association for the purpose of advancing social goals 2I8
while denying protection to legal association for commercial purposes
in Hishon. Justice O'Connor then concluded that the Jaycees are,
primarily a commercial association, because recruitment and sale of
memberships is one of the foremost activities of the association. 219
Several problems arise in relation to Justice O'Connor's analysis.
First, the test of a predominant purpose closely resembles earlier
Supreme Court attempts to draw a line between speech for profit and
speech for other purposes. The attempt to distinguish profit and non-
profit motive in speech was abandoned, primarily because those who
distribute books and newspapers generally have coexistent profit and
expressive motives that are difficult to separate.22 Second, even purely
commercial organizations retain the right to select employees or
associates upon criteria strictly related to the particular commercial
213. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
214. Roberts, 104 S. Ct. at 3257-61.
215. Id. at 3257.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 3259.
218. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-30 (1963).
219. Roberts, 104 S. Ct. at 3261.
220. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
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purposes of the organization.22" ' Despite Justice O'Connor's view that
the commercial nature of the law firm in Hishon precluded the Court
from discussing the relation between gender and the first amendment
activities of the firm,222 the Hishon opinion did in fact address that
relation, applying an analysis similar to the one used in Roberts.23
A third point relating to Justice O'Connor's concurrence is that many
civic and political associations spend a substantial amount of time
and effort in the solicitation of funds and memberships. Political par-
ties are an obvious example, yet the Court in Roberts recognized the
right of a political party to exclude members with incompatible
ideologies. 224
The requirement of a reasonable connection between exclusion and
first amendment purpose will be sufficient in most cases to prevent
abuses of the associational protection. One possible effect of the com-
mercial nature of an association is that a commercial organization
is more likely to be public in nature, and consequently subject to
the requirement that the criteria for exclusion reasonably relates to
the first amendment purpose of the organization. If the first amend-
ment purpose is simply commercial speech, the first amendment in-
terest of the association is diminished. In addition, a reasonable rela-
tion between commercial speech and any suspect exclusion by an
organization is unlikely.
Mixed commercial and ideological association also has received at-
tention in cases involving group boycotts. Commercial boycotts, in
which the objective of the boycotters is to gain economic advantage,
are usually held illegal per se under antitrust law. 2 5 Many boycotts,
however, are motivated by political, social, religious or other non-
commercial purposes, and these boycotts involve both economic and
ideological activity by a group.226 The freedom to buy and sell as
one chooses is always subject to regulation,227 but the use of buying
and selling power to achieve political and social change, and to per-
suade others to the same action, implicates first amendment
freedoms.22
221. Even state agencies can exclude employees whose ideologies are "demonstrably incom-
patible with the mission" of the agency. L. TRIBE, supra note 54, §12-23 at 706.
222. Roberts, 104 S. Ct. at 3260.
223. Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2235.
224. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
225. Note, Constitutional Law - Freedom of Association and the Political Boycott -
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 5 CAmPBELL L. Ra,. 359, 359-60 n.5 (1982).
226. Note, Constitutional Law - The First Amendment and Protest Boycotts: NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 62 N.C.L. Rav. 399, 399 n.1 (1984).
227. Id. at 412.
228. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912-15 (1982).
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A close analogy can be drawn between ideological boycotts and
the activity in Pines. Activity designed to encourage born-again Chris-
tians to do business with Christian establishments also has the effect
of encouraging them not to do business with non-Christians. The ex-
clusion of Pines' advertisement from the CYP business directory is
in effect a message not to do business with him. The purpose, however,
is not to economically injure the excluded businessman, but to fur-
ther interaction among Christians in the community. In this sense,
the refusal to advertise for non-Christians is an indirect ideological
boycott.
Some cases involving application of antitrust law to political boycotts
have found that antitrust law does not encompass such boycotts,229
but the determination of the scope of the law is sometimes influenc-
ed by first amendment considerations.23 In a recent case brought on
a tort theory, the Supreme Court ruled that the first amendment pro-
tected all but the few violent elements of a black boycott of white
businesses.23 ' The legality of a political boycott now is presumed by
the Court, absent a thorough taint of violence.232 The implication from
this and other cases is that a boycott with a clear noncommercial
purpose is protected by the first amendment despite the presence of
strong economic interests. 3 ' Consequently, associations with mixed
commercial and first amendment conduct still may receive full con-
stitutional protection for activities with a reasonable relation to first
amendment aims.
C. Association for Religious Purposes
The presence of a religious purpose in Pines adds a particularly
important factor to the associational question. The right of religious
schools to exclude on the basis of religion frequently appears in
discrimination cases.234 The preference in religious enterprises for
association with persons of the same faith is protected in many ways
229. See Missouri v. NOW, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301, 1316 (8th Cir. 1980) (protest boycott out-
side the scope and intent of the Sherman Act).
230. See id. at 1319 (protest boycott privileged on basis of first amendment, and Supreme
Court recognition of that right when it collides with restraint of trade); Eastern Railroad Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136-38 (1961) (concerted activities used
to influence government action implicate free speech and are not the intended target of the
Sherman Act).
231. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916, 920 (1982).
232. Id. at 933.
233. Note, supra note 226, at 414 & n.108.
234. See e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 n.6; EEOC v. Mississippi College,
626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980).
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from the operation of anti-discrimination law. The clearest example
of this is seen in the special exemption for religious organizations
in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 2"s The exemption permits
religious organizations to discriminate on the basis of religion in
hiring.23 Case law has expanded the scope of the exemption for
churches, holding that the relationship between a church and ministers
is not covered by Title VII, for discrimination of any type."" Even
outside the church-minister relationship, some cases have held that
the Title VII exemption applies to organizations that can present
evidence of a religious basis for racial or sexual discrimination, even
if the assertion is merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination.238 The
Title VII exemption, of course, has no effect upon the application
of state public accommodations law, but serves as an indication of
the range and scope of constitutional deference that may be accorded
religious association under anti-discrimination legislation.
The preference for association with others of the same religious
beliefs can be found in a wide range of settings. The Guide to Religion-
Based Organizations of Attorneys 23 9 lists sixteen societies of lawyers,
most of which limit membership to those of a specific religious faith
or denomination. Some offer associate memberships to those of other
faiths, and membership in one is open to lawyers, judges and law
students who accept certain Christian beliefs.2"" An interesting exam-
ple of religious association occurs in relation to Pines itself. The suit
against CYP was brought on behalf of Pines by the Anti-Defamation
League of B'nai B'rith, "a civic organization of American Jews"
organized to combat racial and religious prejudice in the United
States.2 ' In terms of the relationship between the first amendment
purpose and the type of exclusion, the CYP may stand on better
footing than the Anti-Defamation League. These examples indicate
the prevalence and general acceptance of the type of discrimination
practiced by the CYP.
Relatively straightforward guidelines are available to a court ad-
dressing a conflict between public accommodations law and associa-
235. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-1 (1976).
236. U.S. CotwnssIoN ON CIVIL RiGHTs, RELIGION IN THE CONSTITUTION, A DELICATE BALANCE,
53 (1983).
237. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972).
238. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d at 485. But see Bob Jones University v. United States,
461 U.S. 574, 602-04 (1983) (denying tax exempt status to school claiming religious basis for
racial discrimination).
239. C. CmUsTENsEN, GumE TO RELIGION-BASED ORGANIZATIONS OF ATrOI.NEYs (1979).
240. Id. at 10.
241. Pines, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 374 n.1, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 868 n.l.
1074
1985 / Public Accommodations Law
tional interests. The first amendment purpose of the association, the
selective nature of the organization, and the relationship between the
first amendment purpose and selection criteria are the relevant con-
siderations in determining first amendment protection for association.
These factors are sufficient in themselves to account for any differences
in the protection that should be given to commercial association as
opposed to ideological association.
CONCLUSION
Justice Potter Stewart, dissenting in Pittsburgh Press, was alarm-
ed that the majority treated the first amendment as no more than
a set of values to be balanced against other socially desirable
interests.2"2 While giving full credence to the police power of govern-
ment to prohibit discrimination, Stewart cited with approval the words
of Justice Brandeis that "[e]xperience should teach us to be most on
our guard when the Government's purposes are most beneficient. '2 243
As a general proposition, discrimination in public accommodations
violates broadly accepted views of elementary justice.244 Enforcement
of public accommodations law, however, may entail a cost to other
values that is too great to be permitted. 245 This author has attempted
to aid in determining the point at which that line has been crossed.
The exclusion of others by a publisher in the exercise of editorial
rights triggers the strong protection of the free press clause. Although
limited rights of public access have been applied to broadcast media,
practically speaking, no right of access to private print media can
be asserted. The right of access created by public accommodations
law has no more legitimacy than any other right in an attempt to
break the barrier formed by editorial rights. In most cases, the editorial
right will not be diminished by the presence of commercial content,
particularly if the individual seeking access is seeking a forum for
commercial speech. The presence of a religious purpose in addition
to the commercial interest of the publisher implicates a special pro-
tection afforded to religious expression that counterbalances any ef-
fect of commercial content.
The process of balancing a claim of freedom of association against
public accommodations law has been clarified by the recent Supreme
242. Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Human Relations Commission, 413 U.S. 376, 402-03
(1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
243. Id. (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1927)).
244. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 592 (1983).
245. See Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2236 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
1075
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 16
Court decisions in Roberts v. United States Jaycees and Hishon v.
King & Spalding. Although the associational interest does not have
the same vigor as the press clause in this context, associations of a
purely private nature do retain a broad power to discriminate by ex-
cluding others from membership. Associations of a more public
character may be permitted to discriminate if the criteria for exclu-
sion is closely related to the legitimate first amendment purpose of
the organization. Although purely commercial association receives
minimal first amendment protection, the boycott cases indicate that
association for mixed commercial and ideological purposes may be
protected by the first amendment. If the first amendment purpose
is religious in nature, associational rights gain special protection, par-
ticularly when the exclusion is on the basis of religion.
Courts often may be tempted to defer to the state interest in preven-
ting discrimination because the compelling nature of the interest is
so widely accepted and repeated. The necessity of fully assessing com-
peting first amendment interests should not be overlooked. Individual
rights as fundamental as those secured by the first amendment deserve
closer vigilance in order to preserve their central place in American
legal thought.
Pamela Griffin
1076
